题目：Political Connections and the Rise and Fall of Native Banks in Late
摘要：It remains a puzzle how native banks (piaohao and qianzhuang) achieved sustained growth despite the lacking of legal protection in late Qing China. Drawing upon a unique data of native banks in 17 provinces between 1823 and 1911, and the exogenous variations in the appointment of local officials from the Avoidance System, we examine the role of political connections in substituting the missing legal institutions to facilitate banking development. Our results consistently indicate a “regional favoritism” in the officials-banks nexus: the number of bank branches in a province increased significantly after the appointment of a provincial official who was born in the same native province with the bank owner’s. The importance of political connections is further evidenced by the finding that regions having produced more high officials experienced a greater decline of native banks relative to other places after the collapse of the Qing dynasty.
马驰骋，山东大学经济学院讲师，2011年获香港科技大学社会科学博士学位。研究领域为经济史、发展经济学、政治经济学。讲授经济史、政治经济学、中国经济、中国金融史课程。论文发表于Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Economic History。目前承担国家自然科学基金项目“儒家文化与经济增长：基于历史计量学的经验研究”一项。